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Minding the Gap: Extending Adult Jury Trial
Rights to Adolescents While Maintaining a
Childhood Commitment to Rehabilitation
Jennifer M. Segadelli1
We need a new definition of neighborhood, community, society. .
. . We all need a definition of responsibility. . . . We need another
perspective on the possibilities.2

INTRODUCTION
Notwithstanding a few cases to the contrary, nearly all states have held
that in the absence of a state statute, a juvenile may not demand that his or
her delinquency proceeding be determined by a jury.3 The Sixth
Amendment to the United States Constitution grants the accused “in all
criminal prosecutions . . . the right to a speedy and public trial, by an
impartial jury of the state and district wherein the crime shall have been
committed.”4 In McKeiver v. Pennsylvania, Justice Blackmun, writing for
the plurality, declined to extend the right to a jury trial in juvenile criminal
proceedings in order to uphold the hallmarks of restoration, compassion,
and rehabilitation that have set aside the juvenile system from the adult
system since its inception.5 But in the forty years since Justice Blackmun’s
opinion in McKeiver, has legislative escalation of significant punitive
consequences imposed in juvenile sentences eroded these hallmarks? If so,
does this escalation elevate the importance of acknowledging the right for
an accused juvenile to demand the jury trial afforded to adults who are
prosecuted in a criminal justice system primarily focused on punishment,
not rehabilitation, as the goal?
In a recent Kansas Supreme Court decision, juvenile defendant L.M.6
sought review of the Court of Appeals decision affirming the district court’s
finding of aggravated sexual battery and being a minor in possession of
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alcohol. L.M. claims that he should have had the right to a jury trial and that
the changes in the Kansas juvenile judicial procedures required review of
constitutional construction precluding juveniles from such a right.7 On June
20, 2008, the Kansas Supreme Court agreed and held that the changes to the
juvenile justice system have “eroded the benevolent parens patriae8
character that distinguished it from the adult criminal system,”9 and
“because the juvenile justice system is now patterned after the adult
criminal system, . . . the changes have superseded the McKeiver and
Findlay courts’ reasoning and those decisions are no longer binding
precedent for us to follow.”10
The holding in L.M.’s case overruled Findlay v. State, a twenty-fouryear-old precedent that held that juveniles were not entitled to a jury trial.11
The lone dissenter in L.M. was Chief Justice Kay McFarland, a former
juvenile court judge; Justice McFarland voiced concern in her dissent that
the majority decision put Kansas out of alignment with other states, nearly
all of which adhere to the belief that the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments
to the Federal Constitution do not protect or extend a right to a jury trial to
juveniles.12
The question that arises in the L.M. case and other juvenile cases is
whether the hallmarks of compassion and rehabilitation have already been
lost in the juvenile justice system. If they have, particularly as we move
more toward treatment of juveniles as adults, can the right to a trial by jury
justly be withheld? Or by granting that right, do we risk turning a
rehabilitative and compassionate system into a fully adversarial process
associated with adulthood, the very result Justice Blackmun cautioned
against?
This article argues that the ideas of a constitutional right to a jury trial
and commitments to rehabilitation need not be mutually exclusive; rather,
expansion of established programs has shown that adolescents can be
afforded equivalent constitutional rights while guarding the compassion and
rehabilitation focus that so evidently sets the juvenile system apart from the
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adult system. Adolescents, a very vulnerable group lost between childhood
and adulthood, should have the right to a jury trial and other constitutional
protections without the compromise of the juvenile justice system.
Promotion of a constitutional right need not make the entire juvenile justice
system defunct.
This article explores how well-established “teen courts” may be
expanded and used as a model for full implementation of jury trials in
adolescent court proceedings. Part I provides a background to modern
juvenile justice models by exploring changing concepts of child welfare, the
evolution of the juvenile justice system, the modern juvenile justice system,
and the expansion of constitutionally protected rights to juveniles. Part II
describes the history, development, methodology, and innovation of
Washington State’s juvenile justice system. Part III emphasizes the
importance of jury trials, not only in American history and modern society,
but the particular importance of a jury trial to adolescent offenders.
Next, Part IV discusses the importance of rehabilitation in the juvenile
justice system including the important distinction of childhood, the danger
of losing adolescents in the legal system, and the importance of developing
a unique approach to adolescence jurisprudence. Part V explores the teen
court model, specifically the innovation of Washington State’s teen court
model and the adoption of these models as an opportunity to extend to
juveniles the right to a jury trial without impinging on the uniqueness of the
juvenile justice system. Finally, Part VI concludes that adolescent offenders
have had the worst of both worlds for far too long, and that the only way to
address the unique developmental stage of adolescence in the legal system
is to incorporate adult protections with childhood rehabilitation and
compassion.
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I. HISTORY OF THE JUVENILE JUSTICE SYSTEM AND THE
PROGRESSION OF JUVENILE RIGHTS
Prior to 1899, when Illinois adopted the first juvenile court, statutes and
regulations specifically aimed at juvenile offenders were nearly unheard
of.13 The groundwork laid by Illinois’s juvenile justice system was quickly
and almost universally accepted, and by 1925, every state except Maine and
Wyoming had some system or model for addressing juvenile offenders that
was distinct and separate from adult criminal proceedings.14 The new
approach to juvenile justice “envisioned treating juveniles in a manner
different from adult criminals and focused on rehabilitating juveniles rather
than punishing them.”15 This section explores changing ideas of child
welfare through history, the introduction of the first juvenile courts and
their progression to the modern juvenile justice system, and the expansion
of constitutional rights to juveniles through time.
A. Changing Concepts of Child Welfare Through Time
The development of American policy toward juveniles can aptly be
described as a dichotomy between two attitudes, both of which historically
dominated social thought at different times, and both of which shaped the
modern juvenile justice system—fear of children, and fear for children.16
While the American rhetoric has always emphasized an attitude of childcenteredness, the reality of employing child-centeredness into practice is
much more complex and is critical to understanding the development of
legal attitudes and policies toward juveniles.17
The primary disagreements have been about the nature and legitimacy of
the parental, the community, and the state interest in children, and the role
of children in society.18 Much of the formative thought on the matter is
fueled by the belief that children are fundamentally different than adults and
that they are helpless and dependent on their parents and the state for
everything from survival to protection.19 The position children hold in
society at any time is defined by a compromise between a set of society’s
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ideals and the actual experiences of children in their social setting at any
given time. Between 1820 and 1935, two distinct periods of child welfare
existed, and the shifting values of these periods help illuminate the advent
of the juvenile justice system.20 Throughout history, families have been and
remain the primary welfare institution in the United States; however, that
role began to change as concern arose about the failure of many families to
provide for their children.21 The welfare of children then became a state
policy of social action, and states are now the greatest external force for the
assistance of children.22
1. Child Welfare Between the Early Nineteenth Century and the End of
the Civil War
Child welfare between the early nineteenth century and the end of the
Civil War was dominated by fear for children.23 Child welfare policies and
institutions became a distinct part of society for the first time in the United
States,24 born largely out of the breakdown of the family unit as society’s
sole child welfare provider and the development of alternative child welfare
institutions such as schools and reformatories.25 Debates during this time
occurred over individual morality and responsibility, and the role of
children, parents, and institutions—namely, legitimacy and opportunity for
institutionalizing delinquent children.26 For the first time, lines were drawn
between public and private control of children, and a lasting distinction
emerged between children and adults in legal theory and social reform.27
2. Child Welfare Between the Late Nineteenth Century and the Early
Twentieth Century
By the 1870s, much of the old system’s view of child welfare remained
firmly in place, but growing concerns about the Industrial Revolution led to
an increase in fear of children.28 Several factors contributed to the fear of
children, including further breakdown in family structure brought on by
rising divorce rates, increased population of women entering the workforce
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and seeking education, lower marriage rates among educated women,
growing poverty, increased juvenile delinquency, and lower birth rates
among middle and upper class families and increased birth rates among
lower class and immigrant families, leading to concern about the fate of
children.29 Much of the debate was fueled by a fear that children of
working-class and immigrant families would “undermine” society if left
without institutional intervention.30
The juvenile court first created by the Illinois State Legislature in 1899
was “probably the most prominent of child-saving institutions.”31 There was
a waning faith in self-autonomy and personal responsibility, and a growing
faith in institutionalization of child welfare, making this movement known
as “child-saving.”32 Change in child welfare policy was promulgated by the
assumption that childhood was a “distinctive and vulnerable stage of life,”
inherently different than adulthood.33 The definition and legitimacy of
childrearing needed to be expanded, thus challenging the existing roles of
parents, children, and the state; the hope was to preserve childhood through
adolescence by strengthening children’s dependence on adults and society,
and by removing them from inevitable adult roles.34
By the 1930s, the United States had an established system of child
welfare that had been developed and modified over a decade marked by
policy changes toward children.35 Throughout that time, although it could
be agreed upon that the welfare of children was of central importance to the
state, no consensus could be reached as to method or policy—that is,
whether children were better served if the state aided the family unit, or
whether children and the family unit could only be served by eliminating
the inequities and injustices prevalent in society and institutions.36 Court
decisions have stated, “As a result of disagreements over the place of
children in American society, child welfare practices and beliefs helped
rearrange and redefine the relationship among children, parents, the state,
and civil society.”37
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B. The Evolution of Juvenile Courts and the Modern American Juvenile
Court
When the first juvenile court was founded, its envisioned goals were
removal of the juvenile from the harsh criminal justice system and
protection of adolescence through closed hearings and confidential
records—a vision that took many years, and in some states, decades, to
achieve.38 The juvenile court system, therefore, did not emerge in its
perfection upon creation, but rather it was a “work in progress” and many of
its hallmarks and defining features were additions and responses as the
system grew and developed.39
Since their inception, juvenile courts have been a statutory creation,
which means they can be altered and amended at will, making them distinct
from other court systems.40 Founders of the juvenile courts believed that the
creation of a juvenile justice and court system would be “one of their
generation’s major contributions to the ongoing historical process of
improving the status of children in American society.”41 By 1923, the idea
of a juvenile court, distinct and removed from adult proceedings, was
deeply entrenched in American society.42 The nation agreed that the
juvenile justice system should have broad and exclusive jurisdiction over
youth until the age of eighteen, private hearings, confidential records,
detention, probation, individual treatment, and a focus on rehabilitation.43
The juvenile court system, at its inception, was founded on informality
and sympathy; great effort was taken to remove the juvenile justice system
from mainstream legal institutions.44 Since the late 1970s, and increasing
through the 1990s, there has been a growing trend to criminalize the
juvenile justice system and transfer more cases out of juvenile court for
adult proceedings.45 Much of this came from unrest regarding beliefs that
the informality of the juvenile courts was inadequate to handle the violent
juvenile offender.46 Despite continuing movements to treat more and more
children and adolescents as adults, “the juvenile justice system remains
unique, guided by its own philosophy and legislation and implemented by
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its own set of agencies.”47 Juvenile court administration seeks to include
delinquents, or children in need of intervention to prevent potentially selfdestructive behavior, as well as children in need of protection.48
Despite criticism, it is clear that the juvenile justice system is a
permanent fixture of the American government and a viable institution that
“remains one of the most important social inventions of the modern
period.”49 The need to protect the country’s children, the demands made on
people and states to do so, and the decreasing age of first-time offenders
emphasize the cry to strengthen the juvenile justice system.50
C. The Expansion of Constitutional Rights to Juveniles
Several important Supreme Court decisions have changed the way that
juveniles are processed within the criminal system. Each decision represents
an attempt by the Supreme Court to secure rights for juveniles that were
ordinarily enjoyed only by adults. However, despite these advances,
juveniles still do not enjoy the full constitutional rights that are extended to
adults.
1. Promising Initial Developments in In re Gault
In 1967, the U.S. Supreme Court articulated the following rights for all
juveniles: (1) the right to notice of charges, (2) the right to counsel, (3) the
right to confront and cross-examine witnesses, and (4) the right to invoke
the privilege against self-incrimination.51 This decision, In re Gault, is
perhaps “the most noteworthy of all landmark juvenile rights cases” and
“certainly is considered the most ambitious.”52
Gerald Gault, at age fifteen, was committed as a “juvenile delinquent” on
charges that he had placed an obscene phone call to a neighbor.53 After
hearings and proceedings during which no one was sworn in, no transcript
was made, and no memorandum of proceedings was prepared, Gault was
committed to the Arizona State Industrial School until the age of twentyone, a term of six years in juvenile prison—by way of comparison, an adult
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offender for the same crime would receive a $50 fine and no more than
sixty days in jail.54
Gault never had a chance to face his accuser, nor was he advised at any
point in the process that he had the right not to make a statement.55 The
Arizona Court of Appeals glossed over these issues, noting that the rights to
confrontation and protection against self-incrimination had not been
extended to “infants,” but the Supreme Court disagreed, vehemently stating
that “[i]t would indeed be surprising if the privilege against selfincrimination were available to hardened criminals but not to children.”56
The Court in Gault never addressed the issue of a juvenile’s right to a
jury trial, nor did it address the issue of whether juveniles have a right to a
speedy trial; however, the Court effectively managed to extend some Fifth
and Sixth Amendment rights to the juvenile justice system.57 While it is
hard to comprehend how the Court reconciles protecting and granting some,
but not all, rights under the Sixth Amendment, the extension of the
constitutional rights it did address was the first important step in moving the
juvenile justice system forward.
2. The Development of Proof Beyond a Reasonable Doubt: In re

Winship
In 1970, In re Winship established an important precedent related to the
standard of proof used in juvenile proceedings to adjudicate guilt of a
defendant.58 The U.S. Supreme Court held that the standard of proof in
juvenile proceedings was to be “beyond a reasonable doubt,” which initially
had been reserved only for adult criminal courts.59 Until the holding in
Winship, the standard of proof in juvenile proceedings was “preponderance
of the evidence,”60 a standard that is easier to prove.
The Court held that the evidentiary standard in juvenile proceedings must
align with that of adult criminal proceedings for the same policy and
practical concerns that led courts to extend the standard to beyond a
reasonable doubt in the first place. In criminal proceedings, when the
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defendant’s freedom and autonomy is at stake, due process requires that the
state produce evidence beyond a reasonable doubt, both to ease the minds of
jurors sentencing the defendant and to ensure that only the culpable are
punished.61 The Court concluded saying, “The same considerations that
demand extreme caution in fact finding to protect the innocent adult apply
as well to the innocent child.”62
In light of the Court’s obvious progression toward acceptance of full
constitutional rights to juvenile offenders, it was somewhat surprising when,
a mere year after Winship, and only a few years after Gault, the U.S.
Supreme Court addressed the issue of whether juveniles were afforded
constitutional protection of a trial by jury of their peers and answered with a
decisive and resounding “no.”
3. The End of the Expansion of Constitutional Rights: McKeiver v.

Pennsylvania
In 1971, the U.S. Supreme Court held that juveniles are not entitled to a
jury trial as a matter of constitutional right63 and provided many reasons for
this holding, the first of which was a general statement that the Court “has
refrained . . . from taking the easy way with a flat holding that all rights
constitutionally assured for the adult accused are to be imposed upon the
state juvenile proceeding.”64
The decision in McKevier seems to oversimplify the role that jury trials
play in the justice system and seems to alleviate the juvenile system from
the “burden” of a jury trial; the main concern is not with due process or
fairness, but rather with the efficiency of proceedings.65 One assertion
postulates that judges are more capable of correctly deciding complicated or
technical issues and are more likely to render decisions that are predictable,
consistent, and efficient; as such, juries are seen as unpredictable and less
likely to understand complex issues.66 Jury trials are criticized as an
inefficient use of judicial resources because additional time is added to the
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proceedings for jury selection and deliberation, as well as for sidebar
conferences and resolving evidentiary disputes.67
The second reason the Court provided, and the one that bears the most
weight on this article, is a cautionary and protective mechanism to preserve
the hallmarks of the juvenile justice system. The Court cautioned that
requiring juries in juvenile proceedings would “remake the juvenile
proceeding into a fully adversary process and put an effective end to what
has been the idealistic prospect of an intimate, informal, protective
proceeding.”68
Moreover, the Court relied on the findings in a report created and
produced by the Commission on Law Enforcement and Administration of
Justice (hereinafter the “Commission”) before the findings in In re Gault.69
The Court noted that “[h]ad the Commission deemed [jury trials] vital to the
integrity of the juvenile process, or to the handling of juveniles, surely a
recommendation or suggestion to this effect would have appeared. The
intimations, instead, [were] quite the other way.”70 The Court’s reliance on
the Commission’s report is misplaced. The Commission’s findings occurred
before the developments in In re Gault. It is therefore likely that the
Commission operated during a time when little to no constitutional rights
had been granted to juveniles, and it is fair to understand its caution to
extend those rights without precedent.71
The last significant reason the Court provided in denying the extension of
a right to juvenile jury trials is that the abuses, if any, that occurred in the
juvenile system are not “of constitutional dimension.”72 The Court credited
these abuses on the “lack of resources and of dedication rather than to
inherent unfairness.”73
Since the Court’s ruling in 1971, nearly all states adopted the holding of
McKeiver and statutorily denied a juvenile’s right to a jury trial, and
although it has been called into doubt in numerous cases, very few states
have actually found that the McKeiver rule no longer applies in their current
juvenile justice system.74
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In juvenile proceedings, the U.S. Supreme Court has identified the
pertinent constitutional test: “The problem is to ascertain the precise impact
of the due process requirement upon such proceedings.”75 Since
annunciating this “constitutional test,” courts have found a unique way in
which the test applies to juvenile proceedings. Courts constitutionally
protect the notice of charges, the right to confrontation and crossexamination, the privilege against self-incrimination, and double jeopardy
protection,76 but show a continued reluctance to recognize a jury trial as one
of the constitutionally protected rights for juveniles.
4. In re L.M.: A New Movement in Juvenile Justice?
On June 20, 2008, the Kansas Supreme Court made national headlines
when it found in favor of juvenile L.M.’s appeal on the issue of his
constitutional right to a jury trial in juvenile court. Sixteen-year-old L.M.
was charged and prosecuted as a juvenile offender for aggravated sexual
battery and as a minor in possession of alcohol.77 Prior to trial, L.M.
requested a jury trial, and was denied.78 At the bench trial, L.M. was found
guilty and sentenced as a Serious Offender I,79 with an eighteen-month
sentence in juvenile corrections.80 The fact that L.M. was subject to a more
criminalized offender status paved the way for his appeal, and he argued
that the harsh effect of sentencing with the juvenile justice code in Kansas
had so eroded the benevolence of the juvenile system that it was indistinct
from the adult criminal justice system.
L.M. appealed, arguing that he had a constitutional right to a jury trial
and challenged the constitutionality of the Kansas statute which “provides
that a juvenile who pleads not guilty is entitled to a ‘trial to the court,’ . . .
and . . . gives the district court complete discretion in determining whether a
juvenile should be granted a jury trial.”81
L.M. relied on the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States
Constitution and made three arguments on appeal: first, he claimed that the
changes in the Kansas Juvenile Justice Code (KJJC) eroded the juvenile
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system to the point that it was indistinguishable from the adult criminal
system, and if he were to be treated like an adult, he should have been
afforded full constitutional protections; second, he claimed that juveniles
were entitled to a jury trial under the language of the Kansas Constitution;
and third, he argued that even if juveniles were not constitutionally entitled
to a jury, he should have been afforded one because of the seriousness of
the offense and stigma of the sentence imposed (having to register as a sex
offender).82
The change that L.M. refers to is reflected in the Kansas statute which
sets forth the purpose for the Kansas Juvenile Justice Court. This section
currently provides that the primary goals of the juvenile justice code are “to
promote public safety, hold juvenile offenders accountable for their
behavior, and improve their ability to live more productively and
responsibly in the community.”83 In 1982, when Findlay was decided, the
KJJC was “focused on rehabilitation and the State’s parental role in
providing guidance, control, and discipline.”84 The new language of
“holding offenders accountable for their behavior” and lack of
acknowledgment of a need to provide rehabilitation and guidance to young
offenders was a primary concern of the court in addressing L.M.’s appeal.
Acknowledging the import of McKeiver and Findlay, but realizing the
necessary evolution of the juvenile justice system, the Kansas Supreme
Court reversed the lower court’s ruling concluding “that the Kansas juvenile
justice system has become more akin to an adult criminal prosecution,” and
as a result, “juveniles have a constitutional right to a jury trial under the
Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments.”85

II. THE HISTORY OF JUVENILE JUSTICE IN WASHINGTON STATE
The juvenile justice system in Washington State is governed by the
Juvenile Justice Act of 1977 (RCW 13),86 which establishes a system of
accountability and rehabilitation for juvenile offenders. Washington was the
first, and remains the only state, to use “determinative sentencing” and a
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sentencing grid in juvenile proceedings.87 Committed youth have
determined minimum and maximum sentence terms; for example, fifteen to
thirty-six weeks. Sentencing length is then determined using a point system
based on the seriousness of the offense and the defendant’s previous
criminal history.88 Although this is the makeup of the “standard range,”
juvenile courts and judges retain the authority to sentence outside the
standard range through a finding of manifest injustice.89
In contrast to Kansas, Washington has not extended the right to a jury
trial to juveniles, despite two compelling facts: first, the Juvenile Justice Act
was amended in 1997 to be more focused on punishment rather than
rehabilitation; second, a recent case similarly arguing the erosion of the
juvenile justice system was recently brought to the state supreme court. But,
in State v. Chavez, the Washington State Supreme Court held that “[t]he
Juvenile Justice Act requiring that cases in juvenile court be tried without a
jury does not violate constitutional provisions for right to jury trial because
the juvenile justice system is rehabilitative rather than retributive.”90
Additionally, the Washington State Constitution does not guarantee
juveniles a right to a jury trial by reason of the 1997 amendments to the
Juvenile Justice Code. These amendments increased emphasis on
accountability for serious offenses, while maintaining the court’s ability to
address the unique circumstances and needs of the juvenile and retain
access to rehabilitation rather than punishment.91 The “tough” new 160page juvenile justice law passed in 1997 mandated that sixteen and
seventeen-year-old alleged offenders charged with felonies in adult court be
given a jury trial option, but younger offenders—who may face the same
charges in the same courts—do not get that choice.92 While the 1997
amendments may have increased the rigidity of the Juvenile Justice Code in
Washington State, they showed some initial promise in moving toward a
system offering jury trial options to adolescent offenders. Unfortunately,
“adolescence” cannot be defined with a bright line, and reform in
Washington State, as in other states, is slow to proceed.
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A. Baby Steps . . . Backward?
The federal case law at this point has unabashedly extended several
constitutional rights to juvenile defendants, therefore making no distinction
between juveniles and adults when it comes to constitutional protections:
“Our common criminal law did not differentiate between the adult and the
minor who had reached the age of criminal responsibility.”93
At the same time, when the Washington State Constitution was adopted,
it too made no distinction between juveniles and adults regarding the
provision of a right to a jury trial. Even after the inception of Washington’s
juvenile court, juveniles were still statutorily entitled to a jury trial from
1905 until 1937.94 Beginning in 1909, special provisions were being made
in the Washington juvenile code, including the capacity statute which
specifically contemplates that a “jury” will hear a case where a child
between the ages of eight and twelve stands accused of committing a
“crime.”95 Juveniles were entitled to jury trials when the Washington State
Constitution was enacted in 1889, and they remained entitled until the
Juvenile Justice Act was amended to repeal that right, almost forty years
later,96 an action that certainly begs the question—why?
Again, the rationale provided by the state is repetitive, but its words are
insufficient to support its three-fold conclusion: first, that juvenile crimes
are truly “non-criminal” offenses because of the nature of rehabilitation;
second, that the court is acting in loco parentis; and finally, that
introduction of a jury trial would disrupt this careful balance. The fear
remains that juries are ill-equipped to handle juvenile proceedings. As a
result, more juvenile offenders will be unfairly punished, and the aim will
become more punitive than rehabilitative. This fear is unfounded for all
reasons aforementioned. But of even greater necessity is the expression of
distaste in the amendment of the Juvenile Justice Act to repeal a forty-year
standing right—a right that, until it was repealed, had no negative history or
problematic results, but was instead repealed under the guise of protecting
the juvenile system.
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Washington State is uniquely situated on this issue. The state’s
commitment to social justice and prisoner reform in response to the overcrowded jails and harsh punishments is a hallmark of its criminal justice
system. Arguably, Washington has one of the strictest criminal codes of the
country, but its activists seek to change the system into a more costefficient, rehabilitative institution focused on the value of each individual to
society. Social reform strongly seeks to incorporate rehabilitative aspects
into all criminal proceedings, and if the movement is toward rehabilitation
for all criminal defendants, including adults, then any concern that
constitutional jury trial rights cannot exist with a commitment to
rehabilitation is unsubstantiated. It is clear that adults may be provided with
jury trials and still maintain an element of rehabilitation in sentencing—
why must juvenile proceedings be so different?
Washington State courts have consistently relied on McKevier and prior
state precedent in holding that juveniles do not have a constitutional right to
a jury trial, both under the U.S. Constitution and the state constitution.97 In
the 1999 case of In re J.H., the Washington Court of Appeals, relying on
the state’s prior precedent, affirmed statutes denying juveniles the right to a
jury trial, holding that such statutes do not violate the guarantees of equal
protection under the state and federal constitutions, and that the lack of a
jury trial supports the “unique rehabilitative nature” of juvenile
proceedings.98
This precedent was further affirmed by the Washington State Supreme
Court on March 20, 2008, in a 6–3 ruling to uphold a Court of Appeals
ruling in the case of Azel Chavez.99 Chavez was convicted in juvenile court
on several counts, including attempted first-degree murder, first-degree
robbery, and second-degree assault.100 In 2004, when he was fourteen,
Chavez was accused of attempting to kill three high school football
coaches; he then led police on a high-speed chase through three counties
that ended when he collided with a police car on the Hood Canal Bridge.101
He was sentenced to up to seven years in detention, with a one-year
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enhancement for possession of a firearm.102 The seriousness of the offense
is eerily similar to the case of In re L.M. in Kansas. Given not only the
noxious nature of the crime, but also the harshness of the 1997 amendments
to the Juvenile Justice Code—which, while promising rehabilitation,
actually seek to impose greater punishment on juvenile offenders and move
more serious juvenile offenders to the adult criminal system—Washington
State is no longer in a position to remain juxtaposed with the decision of the
Kansas Supreme Court. Although the Washington State Supreme Court has
consistently accepted the argument that the Juvenile Justice Code remains
distinct from the adult penal system, focusing more on rehabilitation than
punishment, the dissent, led by Justice Barbara Madsen, said that,
“recognizing a right to a trial by jury is not inconsistent with this defining
aspect of the juvenile justice system.”103
B. The Possibility of Advancement
Could the decision of the Kansas Supreme Court mark a new movement
in juvenile justice? Like the Court concluded in In re L.M., some argue that
the juvenile system, like that in Washington State, has eroded so much that
it is indistinguishable from the adult justice system, and that the juvenile
justice system, while conceptually ideological, is nothing more than a
myth.104 Proponents and creators of the juvenile justice system envisioned it
“less like a court and more like a social welfare agency.”105 Juveniles
brought to the attention of the juvenile court were to be helped or protected,
rather than punished as adults.106 As stated earlier, children were not to be
subjected “to the rigors of formal criminal trials,” but were to be handled
informally. In exchange for this informality, they were denied certain rights
and protections afforded to adults in formal proceedings that were deemed
unnecessary in informal proceeding.107
Proponents of the viewpoint that juveniles should have a constitutional
right to a jury trial utilize the rationale that the Kansas Supreme Court used
in In re L.M. They argue that the rehabilitative and “nurturing” ideology of
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the juvenile justice system is, in essence, nonexistent, and the movement is
toward one criminal justice system rather than two that distinguish between
adults and children.108 As such, constitutional protections should be
extended to all in that justice system.109
Conversely, proponents of the “conventional” viewpoint—that a juvenile
does not have a constitutional right to a jury trial—believe that the very
individualized, informal, rehabilitative approach attacked by opponents is
the very thing worth saving about the juvenile justice system. Moreover,
proponents argue that the inclusion of jury trial rights will interfere with the
system’s ability to treat juveniles with compassion focusing primarily on
rehabilitation. Proponents of this view align with the ideals of Justice
Blackmun and the Supreme Court in McKeiver.
Courts and commentators, however, have missed the middle ground and
the coexistence of the two ideals. The construction of the juvenile justice
system no longer needs to be defined by one characteristic or the other—the
two are not mutually exclusive, but rather can and, more importantly,
should exist simultaneously. In fact, compassion, rehabilitation, and fairness
cannot be served in any other way. Due process requires a new juvenile
court; compassion and a rehabilitative focus require the old court system.
The two must find a way to meet.

III. WHY JURY TRIALS MATTER TO SOCIETY AND TO THE
ADOLESCENT OFFENDER
I consider trial by jury the greatest anchor ever yet devised by
humankind for holding a government to the principles of its constitution.
—Thomas Jefferson, 1792
A. Why Jury Trials Matter
The right to a jury trial, along with the other rights encompassed in the
Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments, make up fundamental aspects of the
Constitution’s individual rights. Above all, this right protects offenders
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from judicial bias and adjudicative unfairness; it is a check against state and
judicial power. With it comes the opportunity to inject the norms and values
of society and “reasonable” persons into the court room—norms and values
that are sometimes lost upon the judicial system because they may be
removed from mainstream America. A criminal defendant’s right to a jury
trial was one of the first rights adopted from England, and remains one of
the most valued American rights and protections.110 In fact, no country in
the history of the world has turned to juries more than the United States.111
Invoking juries requires that the law be explained to average individuals,
and as a result of this historical outreach and educational effort, the
judiciary system has been empowered, making the United States the most
independent judiciary in the world. 112
At the same time, the right to a trial by jury is not only a display of
democracy to the accused, but also to the public. Serving on a jury allows
the public to examine the judicial system and participate in its processes.113
Moreover, jury service is a civic responsibility essential to the functioning
of democracy, second only to voting itself.114
Jury trials are essentially an effort to seek and determine truth.
Throughout history, the methods utilized to determine innocence or guilt
have been ineffective and physically unacceptable by the standards now
recognized today; for example, an accused would often be thrown into a
pool to see if he would sink (guilty) or float (innocent).115 Often the
innocent were not retrieved from the water in time to ensure survival.116
Juries bear the great burden of determining guilt and innocence—a task not
required in any other governmental body—and simultaneously act as a
barometer of society’s values and protection against centralized institutional
power.117
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B. Why Jury Trials Are Imperative for the Adolescent Offender in
Delinquency Proceedings
The current juvenile justice system results in juveniles “being denied
both the protections extended to adults in the criminal system as well as the
‘solicitous care and regenerative treatment postulated for children.’”118 The
due process requirements in the adult criminal system are centered on
norms of fairness; therefore, the expansion of constitutional rights to
adolescents should not necessarily focus on the particulars of the rights the
adult system enjoys, but rather the underlying fairness accompanying each
right, its purpose for existence, and how such fairness can best be achieved
for juveniles.119 McKiever, the first “no rights” decision since Gault, made
no attempt to explain how its denial of jury trial rights fit into a coherent
account of fairness for juveniles.120 Jury trial rights are imperative on issues
of fairness to (1) provide a check against a judge’s abuse of discretion, (2)
promote accurate fact finding, (3) compensate for potentially ineffective or
inadequate counsel, and (4) provide legitimacy to the proceeding.121
1. Jury Trials Provide a Check Against Unbridled Judicial Discretion122
One overriding quality of the juvenile justice system is that decisions as
to guilt, innocence, and appropriate sentencing are in the hands of a single
judge. This principle, however, relies on the assumption that juvenile court
judges will not be clouded by their own biases and prejudices, and that they
are capable of consistently delivering fair dispositions.123 One commentator
noted, “Although judges are certainly capable of adjudicating juvenile
procedures in a fair manner, only a jury could ensure that an adolescent is
protected from a judge who is overburdened, or even worse, jaded.”124
Judges may be unfairly impartial for several reasons, including familiarity
with a defendant from previous appearances, damaging evidence, or
previous decisions on similar charges.125
Juries in adult proceedings were originally constructed to ensure fairness
by placing a check on a judge’s unbridled discretion. Because judges alone
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decide the fate of the child, all safeguards to ensuring fairness should be
imposed. If part of the original purpose of juries was to mitigate the plenary
power that judges exercise to increase the probability of a fair result, then it
would seem absurd that the same protection is unnecessary in juvenile
proceedings.126
2. Jury Trials Promote Accurate Fact Finding and Discovery of
Truth127
A jury trial is necessary in juvenile delinquency proceedings in order to
ensure accurate and fair fact finding. Studies have shown that judges and
juries can reach opposing verdicts, even when presented with the same
evidence.128 Fact finding by a jury is necessarily a more reasoned process
than fact finding by an individual, because the defendant, case, evidence,
and facts are viewed by multiple people who must reach a consensus of
guilt in order to convict, ensuring that very few evidentiary questions and
facts go unanswered or unaddressed.129
At the same time, juries fill the gap that likely exists between an adult
judge and an adolescent offender, particularly because juries are a cross
section of society, and therefore, representative of the entire population.
Similarly, the potential addition of Youth Advisory Juries to traditional
juvenile juries (a concept discussed later in this article) would assist in
additional communion between the two.130 Most importantly, however,
juries provide a very human element to fact finding and adjudication of
guilt or innocence because they incorporate common sense, community
standards, and human emotion that can potentially be lost in a legal
proceeding.131
3. Jury Trials Compensate for Unfairness of Potentially Inadequate
Counsel132
Many proponents of juvenile jury trial rights argue that protection and
fairness provided by a jury is necessary because the juvenile justice system
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is becoming characteristically equated with inadequate defense counsel.133
Adolescents often receive subpar legal counsel in comparison to the
representation in adult proceedings because juvenile defense lawyers are
often overworked and undersupervised.134
Complications arising from juvenile representation further affect a
defense counselor’s ability to advocate for his or her client. Such
complications include the tenuous psychological divide between being a
protector of an adolescent’s legal rights and being a guardian-like figure
acting in the juvenile’s best interest, as well as balancing conscious or
subconscious disapproval of the juvenile’s behavior.135
4. Jury Trials Provide Legitimacy to the Proceeding from the
Adolescent’s Perspective136
Jury trials may serve to legitimize the proceeding in the eyes of the
adolescent; without them, the adolescent likely feels he or she was not
afforded the same rights that others similarly situated were, and treatment
was therefore unfair. This concept of “procedural fairness” plays a critical
role in understanding why people obey the law, the cognitive and emotional
development of adolescents to obey the law, and the rates of adolescent
recidivism, discussed in greater detail below. At the same time,
participation in the legal process, the very foundation upon which jury trials
were constructed, empowers adolescents to take an element of
responsibility and involvement in their ultimate fate—an aspect painfully
missing from the current juvenile system. The perceptions of fairness,
impartiality, and involvement that adolescents are likely to feel in a jury
trial proceeding will only serve to heighten rehabilitation and accountability
for their wrong act.137
To deny any criminal defendant, regardless of his or her age, the right to
a jury trial is truly a denial of a fundamental constitutional right. Courts and
commentators have cited numerous reasons for concern in denying
juveniles the right to a jury trial, but what is being masked by their concern
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is an overall feeling of inefficiency. Courts are looking to take the “easy
way out.”138 Jury trials are long and often inefficient procedures, but they
are of such critical importance that the juvenile system should not be
“protected” from their shortcomings. The right to a jury trial is of even
greater importance in the juvenile arena because of the courts’ and society’s
inability to relate to its youth, particularly its adolescent offenders.
Clearly, it is not unprecedented to extend the right to a jury trial to
juvenile offenders, and it would not even be far from the scope of other
constitutional rights now active in the juvenile justice system. But that is not
to say that it would be without its difficulties and issues, the most salient of
which will likely be: who makes up the jury? As we will explore later in the
article, this may not be as big of a hurdle as once believed.

IV. WHY REHABILITATION MATTERS TO THE ADOLESCENT
OFFENDER AND WHY IT SHOULD BE MAINTAINED
The progressive attitude that conceived of the juvenile court system did
so because of the unique aspect and position of juveniles in this society.
Juveniles, for better or worse, are in an extremely different position than
adults, in both maturity (physical, cognitive, and emotional) and in the
capacity to learn, grow, and change—a capacity that, we as adults know,
becomes increasingly difficult with age. The issue is not whether to
eliminate the juvenile court system altogether—to do so would be foolish
and treat minors, who are deservedly distinguishable from adults, with exact
similarity. This section examines the psychology behind why people obey
the law, the important distinction between children and adults, the danger of
losing the adolescent in a dichotomous system, and why methods of
rehabilitation remain crucial for teens.
A. Why People Obey the Law and the Theory of Procedural Justice
Procedural justice theory is the notion that people are more likely to obey
the law and comply with generally accepted social policy if they believe
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that the procedures utilized by the justice system are fair, unbiased, and
efficient.139 This theory is relevant to a juvenile’s right to a jury trial
because, if the juvenile feels that the process with which he was sentenced
was unfair, he may be less likely to respect the law, leading to higher
recidivism rates. Several empirical studies, conducted by Tom Tyler and
others, suggest that people obey the law when the rules and procedures are
consistent with their personal attitudes and values.140 That is, when people
are personally committed to obeying the law, they voluntarily assume the
obligation to do so, irrespective of the risk of punishment.141 People care
enormously about process and greatly value the opportunity to be heard in
an official and unofficial capacity, regardless of the outcome of that fact
finding.142 Tyler’s research further suggests that the behavior of and
processes used by police officers and judges—if perceived by the alleged
offender to be fair, unbiased, and benevolent—can encourage voluntary
acceptance of and compliance with decisions made by legal authorities.143
Such voluntary acceptance of the rules and norms of society can thus lead to
lower rates of reoffending.144 According to Tyler, “one’s sense of obligation
to a certain set of rules is the key element in the concept of legitimacy, as it
leads to voluntary deference.”145
The benefits of a self-regulating and voluntary justice system are
innumerable, in terms of cost and efficiency, and value to the offender.146
Empirical evidence supports the notion that forced compliance and coercion
as a means to shape individual and societal behavior is costly in terms of
staffing, time, and resources.147 Although Tyler’s research has focused
primarily on adult populations, the influence of legitimacy and personal
morality on child development and juvenile delinquency has been examined
in several studies, which lay the groundwork for further exploration of the
effect of self-regulation on adolescent recidivism rates.148 Studies suggest
that adolescents who display “higher stages of moral reasoning” are less
likely to engage in delinquent behavior or reoffend because of feelings of
personal commitment rather than pressure to conform.149 Moreover, “the
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evidence presented . . . suggests that constraint between reported
noncompliance with laws and affective-evaluative orientations toward the
law, legal authorities, and legal institutions tends to be greater among
individuals to whom law is more salient than among those to whom law is
less salient.”150
B. The Important Distinction Between Childhood and Adolescence and the
Intersection of Procedural Justice on Adolescent Behavior and
Recidivism Rates
The picture of the legal construction of childhood aligns closely with our
notions of childhood in society—children are innocent beings, incapable of
making competent decisions, and in need of care and protection; it is this
social construct of childhood that has generated much of the legal policy
aimed at juveniles.151 In reality, however, the legal notion of childhood is
far more complex, and policy makers, who seem capable of discerning a
young child from an adult, have proven incapable of any social construction
for adolescence, classifying these individuals as children or as adults,
without a clear image of the uniqueness of this growth phase in a young
person’s life.152
Much of the legal theory and policy that drives societal decisions are
based on immaturity of the child. Children are dependent on adults and the
state for survival, basic needs, and education that will allow them to become
mature adults.153 Moreover, children may lack the capacity to make sound
decisions because of the cognitive immaturity of their age. This leads to the
belief that others should protect children from undue influence they may
feel as a result of their dependence on society.154 As a result of this societal
image, children are assumed to be inherently different than adults—
cognitively, emotionally, physically, psychologically—and therefore,
“values of autonomy, responsibility, and liberty simply do not apply to
them.”155
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1. The Legal Socialization and Interaction of Adolescents with the
Legal System
Adolescence complicates the legal construction of childhood. Teens are
somewhat of a lost generation in the legal system; no one would propose
that an adolescent and a toddler are similar in their reasoning, cognitive
ability, or emotional maturity, and because of that, “the presumptions of
developmental immaturity that shape the legal account of childhood do not
fit comfortably with conventional images of adolescence.”156 Conventional
wisdom, however, supports the notion that adolescents, though distinct from
children, are not fully formed adults. Many are still dependent on their
parents or the state financially, emotionally, or physically, and this age is
particularly vulnerable to immature decisionmaking and negative peer
pressure.157 Because the law and society often fear the instability of this
particular group of juveniles, ease and efficiency support categorizing them
either as children or as adults, thus ignoring this very unique developmental
stage of growth.158
Behavioral psychologists studying adolescent populations and their
interactions with the legal system generally focus their research on a
question closely related to why people obey the law, discussed in depth
above. Their research focuses more on the factors that shape adolescent
criminal behavior that are often far more involved than mere maturation and
psychological development.159 An adolescent’s “legal socialization” is not a
static process between childhood and adulthood; it is ever-developing and
evolving and is heavily influenced by one’s peers, family unit, and
neighborhood culture.160 Similarly, an adolescent’s law-related behavior is
shaped by a myriad of factors, including legitimacy of the legal process and
authority figures, an obligation to obey the law from a normative
perspective, and personal legal cynicism.161
Specifically, research has found that an adolescent’s perception of fair
procedures is based upon the degree to which the adolescent was given the
opportunity to be heard in a judicial setting; the neutrality, quality, and
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benevolence of the fact-finding process as well as whether the adolescent
was treated with respect and politeness.162 Procedural justice directly affects
an adolescent’s compliance with the law and similarly affects whether an
adolescent views the law, authoritarian figures, and legal institutions as
legitimate.163 Empirically, a causal relationship thus exists between an
adolescent’s perceptions of procedural fairness and the likelihood that the
adolescent will initially encounter the legal system or later reoffend.
2. The Causal Connection Between Legal Socialization, Procedural
Fairness, and Adolescent Recidivism Rates
New social science research focusing on whether a causal connection
exists between procedural justice and rates of juvenile recidivism has found
that the causal connection between the two is not outcome dependent.164 An
adolescent was less likely to reoffend because he deemed the procedure
“fair” (and therefore legitimate) rather than because of a positive or
negative outcome in his adjudication.165
At the same time, research indicates a link between an adolescent’s
capacity to take responsibility for his actions and his ability and willingness
to participate in the legal process and rehabilitative services.166 The
connection between an adolescent’s mental, emotional, and cognitive
development and his sense of accountability and cooperation with
rehabilitation is also relevant in contexts outside the criminal arena. For
example, in the civil context, an adolescent’s development and his sense of
cooperation is pertinent when commitment or inpatient treatment is a
consideration; an adolescent is more likely to cooperate with therapeutic
measures if he has ownership in and respect for the decision-making
process.167 Evidence suggests that allowing adolescents to direct their own
care in the therapeutic or medical context enhances the ultimate effect and
success of their rehabilitation.168 Such an examination “highlights the
importance of ensuring that juveniles have the opportunity for meaningful
and knowing participation in the legal system.”169 Such meaningful and
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knowing participation increases the likelihood that an adolescent will deem
the procedure “fair,” and decreases the rates of adolescent recidivism. Such
involvement also promotes success in an adolescent offender’s
rehabilitation and reintegration into society, an important concept of child
welfare in the juvenile justice system further discussed below.
3. Slipping Through the Cracks
Adolescents are neither adults nor children, and in a dichotomous legal
system, they seem to fall through the cracks by being denied access to both
groups’ protections and rights.170 Children cross the line to legal adulthood
at different rates and in different stages, yet the law provides no clear
distinction of age at which to consider a child an adult. For example, at age
ten, a youth charged with murder may be tried as an adult in many states,
and high school students have rights of political expression protected by the
First Amendment.171 However, young adults cannot consent to most
medical procedures, including abortion or sterilization, cannot vote until age
eighteen, and cannot consume alcohol until age twenty-one, three years
after they are able to enter the armed forces.172 The logic that divides this
boundary is far from obvious.
During the twentieth and twenty-first centuries, legal policy makers
ignored adolescence and continued to shift the boundary between childhood
and adulthood depending on the policy goal at stake.173 More bluntly,
“American law embodies an informal legal presumption that adolescents are
children, subject to a fair number of exceptions. . . . It has not worked well
in juvenile justice policy, where the simplistic categorization . . . has
undermined our ability to achieve a viable, effective, and human juvenile
justice approach.”174
The social aspects forming legal policy around the juvenile court system
present unique challenges in attending to adolescence as a distinct
developmental stage between childhood and adulthood. Only after the court
started extending rights to juveniles was this distinction acknowledged and
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aided. Legal definitions have too long ignored the transitional stage between
childhood and adulthood. Individually placing adolescents into either
category based on maturity or culpability has serious consequences, because
these adolescents are neither innocent children nor blameworthy adults.175
In her book about the legal construction of childhood, Elizabeth Scott
suggests that “policies that fail to acknowledge this are unlikely to serve the
public interest or that of young offenders.”176
In the juvenile justice system, the goals of providing youth welfare and
welfare for society have been treated as irreconcilable.177 Juvenile courts
have proven to be an arena where the dichotomy between childhood and
adulthood, and the absence of recognition of adolescence, leads to
ineffective policies and subpar approaches for handling youth offenders.178
The gradual expansion of constitutional protections and rights to juveniles
has proven an effective means of respecting the uniqueness of the
adolescent who is neither an adult nor a child.179 In order to ensure that
protection remains for these unique individuals, courts must continue to
adapt and extend rights to adolescents as necessary to account for the
differences between a child offender, an adolescent, and an adult.
C. Maintaining Models of Rehabilitation and Therapeutic Jurisprudence for
Adolescents
The early juvenile court was so entrenched in ideals of rehabilitation that
blameworthiness and responsibility had no place in its nurturing model.180
But as juvenile crime increased, particularly in the age group that most
social psychologists refer to as adolescence (ages twelve to eighteen), a cry
came for juvenile reform. Proponents of transferring adolescent offenders to
adult courts called for adult penalties, insisting that adolescents are more
mature and more responsible than children, and therefore more culpable and
blameworthy.181 In the justice system—all things being equal—the more
noxious the crime, the greater the punishment; but all things are not equal
when comparing adolescent and adult crime.182 Adolescents are more able
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to change and adapt than adults and have a greater emotional, mental, and
cognitive ability to change than adults. Because of this, the role
rehabilitation plays in the juvenile justice system is critical to its ability to
achieve adolescent compliance and reduced recidivism rates.
The issue of handling adolescent crime has sharply divided American
society, mostly because people neither expect adolescents to be criminals,
nor do they anticipate them to commit such radically violent crimes.183
Because this dilemma forced policymakers to define childhood and criminal
activity along a continuum rather than a bright line, two ideologies
prevailed. First, already discussed at length, adolescents have different
competencies than adults and thus should be treated differently than adults.
Second, adolescents have a different potential for change than adults;
therefore, the justice system should focus on the rehabilitation of young
offenders rather than the strict punishment associated with adult
proceedings.184
It has been postulated that rehabilitative goals have a place and role in
adult criminal justice, but these goals have an even more important role in
juvenile criminal justice, especially to adolescents because of the enormous
cognitive and emotional growth and maturation they experience during this
period.185 Adolescents are particularly malleable, often influenced heavily
by parents, peers, schools, and other settings. Given this malleability and
potential for change not associated with adulthood, “transferring juveniles
into a criminal justice system that precludes a rehabilitative response may
not be very sensible public policy” and may actually allow society to
relinquish children for whom there is hope.186 Adolescence is also a time
when emotional, intellectual, and social habits become engrained and
endure into the adolescent’s adult life. Therefore, “adoption of the
rehabilitative stance toward juvenile offenders is not only especially
appropriate but also especially consequential.”187
Bad decisions about juvenile justice policy and punishment may have
cumulative consequences for the adolescent that are difficult, if not
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impossible, to later undo.188 Social psychologists acknowledge that
adolescents, more than children, must make mistakes in order to learn, and
as such, they are prime candidates for rehabilitation if done correctly.189
Adolescent offenders should be sentenced to special facilities that avoid the
brutality of adult prisons and address the special needs of a young adult,
including education, vocational training, and nutritional needs.190 “Adult
correctional facilities rarely address rehabilitative goals with adult
offenders. They are even more poorly suited to address the special
rehabilitative needs and opportunities posed by juvenile offenders.”191
Additionally, imposing long, harsh, punitive sentences carries different
implications when the offender is an adolescent or child than when the
offender is an adult.192
At the same time, adopting a rehabilitative approach for adolescent
offenders does not mean that punishment has no merit and should not be
used. Instead, it means that adolescent offenders “should be punished and
held responsible within a system designed to treat children, not fully mature
adults.”193 Research suggests that rehabilitation is the “most reasonable
course of action for juvenile offenders, not only because they are less
culpable, but also because as their brains are developing they are especially
amenable to learning how to behave properly.”194 Adolescents, because
their brains are not fully developed, cannot fully think through and
contemplate the consequences of their actions. If premeditative thought is
not inherently present in the adolescent brain, then deterrence is ineffective,
and society’s goal should be assisting the adolescent in becoming a fully
functioning member of society.195

VOLUME 8 • ISSUE 2 • 2010

713

714 SEATTLE JOURNAL FOR SOCIAL JUSTICE

V. EXPANDING CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS AND EXPLORING
REHABILITATION: HOW TEEN COURTS AND YOUTH ADVISORY
JURIES MAY BE USED AS MODELS IN JUVENILE JURY RIGHTS
REFORM
The vision behind teen court programs, including Washington State’s
teen court program, is to utilize positive peer pressure, self-determination,
ownership, and responsibility in juvenile proceedings for misdemeanors to
encourage participation and reduce recidivism rates. The well-established
foundation laid by teen court programs can further be channeled into
potential Youth Advisory Juries, which can act as a stepping stone to full
integration of jury trial rights for juveniles.
A. What are Teen Courts?
Teen courts are a division within several juvenile court systems.
Although they utilize court-like procedures, they are essentially teen
diversion programs196 that are typically offered to first-time misdemeanor
offenders, often charged with traffic offenses, assault, possession of alcohol,
theft, disorderly conduct, or truancy.197
Predecessors to modern teen courts appeared at least sixty years ago. The
modern idea of teen courts started to take shape in the 1970s and
experienced a particular boom of popularity in the mid- to late-1990s, due
particularly to financial support from the Justice Department’s Office of
Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention (OJJDP).198 Currently, more
than eight hundred teen courts operate nationwide, with many more in the
planning stages.199 Paula A. Nessel of the American Bar Association notes
that “their rapid growth is compelling evidence that they are fulfilling a
recognized need.”200 Teen courts provide a voluntary alternative to the
traditional juvenile justice system for offenders charged with less serious
crimes. Proceedings mirror those of a traditional court, but typically, the
jury, prosecutor, defense counsel, bailiff, and clerk are all youths in an
almost entirely youth-run courthouse.201 Currently, in most teen courts,
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young offenders are referred to the program for sentencing after admitting
to the charges against them. In most courts, teens are not responsible for
adjudicating guilt or innocence (although a few programs utilize this
approach).202
The extent of youth responsibility in any given teen court program
depends heavily on the model being implemented.203 In general, teen court
models are grouped into four basic categories: adult judge, youth judge,
youth tribunal, and peer jury.204 Adult judge and peer jury models most
closely mirror typical court proceedings. The adult judge model is similar to
the youth judge model, except that a figure from the legal community
(usually a volunteer attorney or retired judge) acts as the judge and manages
courtroom dynamics.205
The youth tribunal model eliminates the jury from the proceedings and
instead consists of a panel of youth judges that hear cases presented by
youth attorneys.206 The peer jury model closely aligns with a grand jury.
Youth juries question defendants directly after the case is presented by
youth or adult attorneys.207 All youth models maximize youth involvement
because both require that teens are involved in and perform all necessary
roles.208
Philosophically, teen courts embrace the hallmarks associated with the
juvenile justice system, including providing rehabilitative qualities for the
defendant, victim, and community as they all collaborate to resolve the
dispute.209 At the same time, teen court jury trials are similar to the adult
process. Judi Bertrand, an adult judge who oversees teen court proceedings
in Texas, notes: “To have to get up there and testify makes them more
nervous. This is better than just paying a fine, because they have to take
responsibility.”210
B. Washington State’s Teen Court Program
Washington State is home to over thirty teen court offshoots, including
teen courts in Bellingham, Lake Forest Park, Auburn, Kirkland, Port
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Angeles, and Issaquah.211 The oldest teen court in Washington State is in
Issaquah and was created in the 1960s.212 The most nationally recognized
and visible teen court in the state, however, is the Whatcom County Teen
Court, located in Bellingham.
The Whatcom County Teen Court was created in 1998 as a result of
discussion between the Superior Court Commissioner who was assigned to
juvenile offenses that year and Northwest Youth Services.213 Discussions
centered on new methods for providing community service to juvenile
offenders, offering them a way to constructively give back to their
community, shortening the time needed to resolve charges, and reinforcing
the need for individual responsibility and responsibility to the
community.214 Whatcom County Teen Court cases are traditionally heard in
front of a jury of high school students who are charged with determining the
defendant’s penalties.215 Because of its commitment to rehabilitation of
adolescent offenders, the Whatcom County Teen Court has received the
Liberty Bell Award from the Whatcom County Bar Association, as well as
the Ken Grass Founders Award from the Whatcom County Commission on
Children and Youth.216
According to a Washington State study by the U.S. Department of
Justice, adolescents whose cases are heard in Washington teen courts have
only a 6 percent recidivism rate, compared to an 18 percent recidivism rate
for juvenile cases heard in traditional courts.217 At the same time,
Washington State taxpayers save over ninety-two thousand dollars for each
case that is diverted from traditional courts to state teen courts.218
Collectively, Washington State approached its commitment to teen courts
in a unique manner.219 The Council on Public Legal Education—which is
housed inside the Washington State Bar Association—is committed to “the
education of the people of Washington about their legal rights and
responsibilities in order to help them participate effectively in a democracy
and in the justice system.”220 Because of the value that youth courts were
shown to have on educating volunteers and offenders about the law and the
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consequences of their actions, the council launched a statewide campaign to
strengthen existing youth courts and create new youth courts.221
C. How Teen Courts May Act as a Stepping Stone for Jury Trial Integration
Without Impinging on the Uniqueness of the Juvenile Justice System
Teen courts were developed as a community-based approach to the
problem of adolescent crime.222 The guiding principle of teen courts is that
youth are more responsive to the disapproval of their peers than to
disapproval of authority and the legal system.223 Although teen courts
across the country utilize different approaches, what seems to be consistent
throughout is the imposition of sentences by youth juries.224
The developers of teen courts strongly believe that, because an
adolescent’s cognitive and emotional development (or lack thereof) makes
them particularly susceptible to peer-influence, courts where teens are able
to question and confront one another on peer delinquent behavior have a
powerful rehabilitative effect.225 Teen courts, therefore, attempt to harness
peer pressure and use the influence of peers in a positive manner, namely as
a deterrent for future crime.226
Additionally, many—if not all—adolescent defendants going through the
teen court system are required to serve a term as a jury member for other
youth offenders.227 Because of this requirement, teen courts are thought to
have a beneficial social and educational effect on teens and assist in
reintegrating delinquent youth back into society.228 The goal of teen courts
is ultimately rehabilitative with respect to teen defendants (a hallmark of
juvenile proceedings), while requiring acknowledgment of responsibility (a
hallmark of adult proceedings).229
For too long, adolescents have had the worst of both worlds—adult
protections are not extended to them because they are not adults, but
childhood rehabilitative foci are ignored because they are not children.230
The difficulty in creating policy that expands the teen court model is that
the program is generally limited to minor crimes committed by first-time
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offenders.231 It has yet to be seen how a youth court would respond to major
felony cases or the imposition of sentences of incarceration.232
Additionally, several questions inevitably arise regarding expansion of
this model into full jury trial rights for adolescent defendants. Clearly,
“teens could not be the principle participants or decision makers” in
juvenile jury trials for many of the same reasons that they should not be
treated as adults—cognitively and emotionally they cannot and should not
be expected to adjudicate cases unsupervised because they lack the
educational and life experiences that make this possible for adults.233
However, this should not discount the role that teens could play in ordinary
juvenile court proceedings and potential jury trials. Youth Advisory Juries
may act as the step needed to integrate rehabilitative teen court models into
full jury trials for adolescent offenders.
Youth Advisory Juries could be comprised of six to eight members, many
of whom could be conditionally released juveniles serving probationary
sentences.234 In this sense, selection of adolescent jurors would more closely
align with selection of jurors in teen courts, rather than traditional selection
of adult jurors who are called to serve via summons and are selected only
after a lengthy questioning process by case counsel. As opposed to acting
on their own volition, the teen jurors would merely comprise a part of an
otherwise traditional jury; that is, jury selection and the role of the jury
would be identical to adult proceedings, save for the presence of six to eight
teen jurors assisting in the proceedings. Taking a cue from teen courts, these
Youth Advisory Juries should be allowed to make comments, ask questions
of the judge and other jury members, and witness adjudication of guilt or
innocence. Under an approach like this, the court and the jury do not lose
their actual authority as a decision-making body.235 A traditional jury would
still determine guilt or innocence; however, youth involvement makes the
process less adversarial and more aligned with “peer review” associated
with adult jury trials. At the same time, forcing a teen to face his or her
peers will have tremendous rehabilitative aspects (as seen from teen court
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models) and still serve the needs of the adult justice system, that is,
constitutionally protected rights and offender responsibility. Additionally,
the teens serving on the Youth Advisory Jury, many of whom were
offenders themselves, will be provided with a unique perspective of real
adjudications, which may serve as a deterrent or preventative tool for the
youth juror himself as his empathy and institutional understanding
increase.236
The creation of Youth Advisory Juries should be given serious
consideration as a role in jury trials for juvenile proceedings. The strong
success of teen courts suggests that adolescents should play a role in
adjudications.237 The most logical place to employ Youth Advisory Juries is
in a state like Washington, where successful teen courts are already
operating, and social activism remains focused on rehabilitation for criminal
defendants.238 If states can shift their focus to the idea that a juvenile’s
constitutional rights can be protected while simultaneously upholding
values of rehabilitation, then juvenile adjudication may adopt a more
holistic, constitutionally appropriate approach to treatment of adolescents.
It is crucial that all states, especially Washington State, with its unique
opportunity for employment of Youth Advisory Juries, recognize the
democratic values and fundamental fairness that make extension of
constitutional rights to all adolescents imperative. The foundation of this
country did not distinguish between adults and children for the purpose of
constitutional rights, and neither did the Washington State Constitution
when it was adopted. Courts are ill-placed to decide, years later, that such a
right never existed. Courts are essentially picking and choosing the rights
they deem “appropriate” for juveniles under the guise of protecting the
careful balance between punishment and rehabilitation.

CONCLUSION
The sad truth is that our society greatly undervalues young people.
Adolescents comprise a group of individuals that adults fear and fear for;
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the result is a standstill on how to promote their wellbeing. Simply put, we
have stopped caring enough to continue moving forward. We must
constantly experiment, evaluate, and rethink matters if we wish to
contribute meaningfully to the definition of “what works” in juvenile court
adjudication.239 “Although American public rhetoric may suggest that we
cherish the young, the minuscule amount of government resources
dedicated to programs dealing with children’s issues demonstrates that the
problems of the young are a low social priority.”240
Without restoration of several constitutional rights to the juvenile justice
system, adolescents are easy prey for a system that does not seem to know
where they best belong. We cannot dismiss the juvenile justice system as
moot or mythical, because the rehabilitative focus of this system has proven
beneficial. Unless courts are willing to begin to view an adolescent as
deserving of constitutional protections, how can courts truly protect the best
interests of the juvenile? How does a court system that systematically
denies juveniles their constitutional rights, while at the same time attempts
to protect them, ever operate to its fullest capacity? The bottom line is that it
cannot. In the same way that the adult criminal justice system cannot
operate fairly and efficiently without constitutional considerations, neither
can the juvenile system. To suggest anything else would be to say that
juvenile offenders are less deserving of the very due process and equal
protection clauses that this country was founded on.
Jury trials are necessary for juvenile offenders so that they may protect
themselves from being subjected to biases, in the same way that jury trials
protect adults in adult proceedings. Because adolescents are a uniquely
malleable group, using a youth jury may steer peer pressure in positive,
rehabilitative ways that make adolescents accountable to their communities.
It is time that adolescents have a place in the American legal system.
Because adolescents are neither adults nor children, the gap created
simultaneously removes childhood compassion and adult constitutional
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protections. If we don’t mind the gap, we risk losing this incredibly
vulnerable group.
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